Abstract. Sending private messages over communication environments under surveillance is a very important challenge in communication security and has attracted a lot of attention from cryptographers through time. We believe that resources other than cryptographic keys can be used to provide communication privacy. We consider private message transmission (PMT) in an abstract multipath communication setting between two communicants, Alice and Bob, in the presence of a third-party eavesdropper, Eve. Alice and Bob have no a priori shared keys and furthermore, Eve is computationally unbounded. There are a total of n paths, and the three parties can have simultaneous access to at most ta, t b , and te paths. The parties can reselect their accessed paths after every λ bits of communication over a path. We study two types of perfect (P)-PMT and asymptotically-perfect (AP)-PMT protocols. The former has zero tolerance of transmission error and leakage, whereas the latter allows for positive error and leakage, which tend to zero as the message length increases. We derive the necessary and sufficient conditions (based on the above parameters) under which P-PMT and AP-PMT are possible. We also introduce explicit P-PMT and AP-PMT protocol constructions. Our results show that AP-PMT protocols attain much higher information rates than P-PMT ones. Interestingly, Alice and Bob can achieve AP-PMT even in unfortunate conditions that they have the least connectivity (ta = t b = 1) and Eve may access all but one paths (te = n − 1). It remains however an open question whether the derived rates can be improved by more sophisticated AP-PMT protocols. We study applications of our results to private communication over the real-life scenarios of multiplefrequency links and multiple-route networks. We show practical examples of such scenarios that can be abstracted by the multipath setting: Our results prove the possibility of keyless information-theoretic private message transmission at rates 17% and 20% for the two example scenarios, respectively. We discuss open problems and future work at the end.
≤ 1− te n , where ∆ = (2 λ 2 −2 −0.25) −1 , for both one-way and two-way communication settings. Although finding the precise capacity expression remains an interesting theoretical question, the bounds give a fairly tight approximation of the capacity for practical values of λ > 100 (See Section 6 on our practical consideration). We next consider AP-PMT and prove the same bounds for AP-secrecy capacity 1 − te n − ∆ ≤ C FA ∼0 ≤ 1 − te n . The conclusion is relaxing secrecy and reliability requirements to asymptotically perfect does not help us improve PMT rates in the full-access case.
PMT in the general case. Starting from perfect secrecy, we show that P-PMT is possible if and only if t e < t ab , where t ab = min(t a , t b ). Furthermore, the capacity falls between the almost tight bounds of 1−
, regardless of whether one-way or two-way communication is allowed. Note that the bounds are irrespective of n: The PMT construction simply fixes t ab paths (and forgets about the rest of the network) and applies SSS as in the full-access case. When t ab n, the capacity C 0 ≈ 1 − te t ab is far below the full-access capacity C FA 0 ≈ 1− te n . We show however that higher rates can be achieved by using AP-PMT instead. We show that t e < t b is the necessary and sufficient connectivity condition for "one-way" AP-PMT; more surprisingly, we introduce a construction which achieves the rate show that for many interesting scenarios, the rate is fairly close to the full-access capacity C FA 0 . Last but not least, we show that when interactive communication is allowed, AP-PMT is possible even when t e ≥ t b , only requiring (i) Eve does not observe all paths (t e < n) and (ii) Alice and Bob can communicate (t a , t b > 0). We introduce an interactive PMT construction with the secrecy rate (as in full-access) even in situations where communicants suffer from poor connectivity regime, i.e., t e = n − 1 and t a = t b = 1.
Tables 1 summarizes our theoretical results about P-PMT and AP-PMT over the multipath setting. For simplicity, we assume that ∆ → 0 which is reasonable according to our practical consideration of λ > 100. While connectivity range remains always the same in the full-access case, in general, AP-PMT works under a much wider connectivity range compared to P-PMT. When interaction is permitted, AP-PMT is always possible as if in the full-access case. Table 1 . PMT connectivity conditions and capacities in the (n, t a , t b , t e , λ)-multipath setting
Full Access Partial Access
One-way Two-way One-way Two-way Connectivity P-PMT te < n te < t ab Comparing the P-secrecy and AP-secrecy capacities shows that in the full-access case, both equal 1 − te n and the rate is achieved by the one-round PMT scheme F 0 . In general however, the achievable rates for P-PMT and AP-PMT deviate: While P-PMT rates cannot exceed [1 − te t ab ] + , it is possible to get close to the maximum rate of 1 − te n (as in full-access) by taking benefit of AP-PMT protocols. The values ξ * and ξ * * vary depending
Although the UFH technique provides key-less secure communication over physical channels, the security it offers is solely "jamming resistance". This should not be confused with data confidentially and/or integrity that is traditionally defined in cryptography. UFH does not guarantee data confidentiality and assumes it has been taken care of over higher layers via cryptographic tools. UFH does not provide data integrity either: It even takes use of higher-layer message authentication to provide reliable assembly of transmitted packets as a countermeasure against jamming attacks. Relying on higher-layer cryptographic primitives in UFH has two drawbacks: (i) the need for a public-key infrastructure (or shared keys) and (ii) only computational security guarantees.
We for the first time show that multiple-frequency channels can be used for private communication. In contrast to the above, our approach to PMT has two advantages: (i) it does not rely on higher-layer cryptography, and (ii) it provides security against computationally-unlimited adversaries.
Multipath routing Multipath routing consists of finding multiple routes over a network from a source node to a destination node, and using them for the purposes of reliable data transmission, load balancing, and/or higher aggregate bandwidth. The technique has has been explored in different contexts, such as the Internet, sensor networks, and mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs). In all these applications, multipath routing includes two main components, namely route discovery and maintenance and traffic allocation. The former finds the multiple routes between the communicants, and the latter deals with how data is distributed amongst the routes. Split multipath routing (SMR) [9] is one of such protocols, proposed for MANETs, that allows the source node to discover and allocate traffic over maximally-disjoint paths.
Despite multipath routing approaches have been mainly proposed for reliability and efficiency of data transmission, the idea can be also used to provide security. We noted earlier that a primary motivation for the well-studied SMT problem is secure communication over highly connected networks. Similarly, one can motivate the application of our results to private transmission over such networks. The advantage of PMT is that it allows Alice and Bob to communicate privately even if they do not access to ALL disjoint paths, rather use a random subset that is not known to the eavesdropper.
Notation
We use [x] + for a real value x to show max{0, x}. For two random variables X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y, we denote their statical distance by SD(X, Y ) = 0.5 x∈X | Pr(X = x) − Pr(Y = x)|. All logarithms are in base 2. The following notations are specific to our work and are used frequently throughout the paper.
n Total number of communication paths S A multipath setting t a Number of paths accessible to Alice Π A PMT protocol t b Number of paths accessible to Bob F A PMT scheme or a family of protocols t e Number of paths accessible to Eve R Secrecy rate λ Length of a time interval in bits C Secrecy capacity
Throughout, we consider ∆ a negligible value for our numerical analysis by assuming large λ.
Preliminaries
2.1 Threshold, ramp, and quasi-ramp secret sharing schemes Secret sharing is the task distributing a secret value S among a set of m players such that only qualified subsets of those players can recover the secret efficiently, while no information is leaked to an unqualified subset. A secret sharing scheme (SSS) is defined by a pair (Share, Rec) of functions. The share function Share maps secret S to shares X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X m , and the recovery function Rec maps the presented shares X 1 , . . . , X m to a secret estimateŜ. At the time of reconstruction, the i-th share value X i can be null (showed by Λ) meaning that the player i is not present. The secret estimateŜ is expected to equal S if the collection of shares is qualified and ⊥ otherwise. A (k, m)-threshold secret sharing scheme (SSS) [3, 19] distributes a secret as m shares such that any ≥ k shares are qualified and any k − 1 or fewer are unqualified. Ramp SSSs are thus introduced as an extension to relax the secrecy requirement aiming at lowering the share size. As an extension of this, a (k, r, m)-ramp SSS where r ≤ k, guarantees that ≥ k shares are qualified and ≤ k − r shares are unqualified, while information leakage increases as the number of shares tends from k − r to k. The definition gives threshold SSS as a special case when r = 1.
Polynomial-based SSS. The simplest example of a (k, n)-threshold SSS is the polynomial-based construction, due to Shamir [19] , which puts the secret (from field F p of size p) as the constant term of a random polynomial of degree k − 1 over F p [x] and obtains m shares as points on the polynomial. The construction can be easily converted to a ramp SSS by allowing the secret to include r (instead of 1) points on the random polynomial. Both threshold and ramp schemes are optimal in their kind as they provide the smallest possible share sizes achievable for the secrecy that they promise. The detailed description of the polynomial-based (k, r, m)-ramp SSS is as follows.
(k, r, m)-ramp SSS (Share pol , Rec pol ). Let p ≥ m + r and S ∈ F r p be the secret.
. . , f (r − 1) = S r−1 and returns m shares
through Lagrange interpolation, and returns the secret S = (f (0), f (1), . . . , f (r − 1)).
Algebraic-geometric SSS. In the polynomial-based SSS, the number of shares (m) should be less than the number of distinct points p on the polynomial, i.e., no more than p − 1 shares can be distributed. Algebraicgeometric constructions resolve this issue by using curves of high enough genus, instead of polynomials, over fields. Garcia and Stichtenoth [7, Theorem 3.1] show an explicit family of curves over a field of size p (when p is a square) which have at least ( √ p − 1)g points, where g is the curve genus. Chen and Cramer [4] use this result to construct an algebraic geometric (k, g, m)-quasi-threshold SSS over F p for any m < ( √ p − 1)g for arbitrarily large g: quasi-threshold SS guarantees any k − 1 or fewer shares are unqualified and any k + 2g or more shares are qualified. As the authors note [4, Section 4] the construction can be used to give a (k, r, g, m)-quasi-ramp SSS, where k + 2g ≤ m, with ≤ k − r shares unqualified and ≥ k + 2g shares qualified. The following is a description of Chen and Cramer's algebraic-geometric SSS using Garcia-Stichtenoth family of curves.
(k, r, g, m)-quasi-ramp SSS (Share alg , Rec alg ). Let C be a Garcia-Stichtenoth curve with genus g over F p , where p is a square and ( √ p − 1)g ≥ m + r. Define Q, P 0 , P 1 , . . . , P m+r−1 as any m + r + 1 distinct rational points on C, D = (k + 2g).(Q) as a rational divisor of C, and L(D) as the Riemann-Roch space associated with D. Let S ∈ F r p be the secret.
and returns m shares
. . , X m ) chooses the first k + 2g non-null shares X i = Λ (if not possible returns ⊥), obtains f (.) through linear interpolation and returns the secret
The important advantage of the above construction is the improved condition m + r ≤ ( √ p − 1)g such that the right hand size can be large with g, despite a constant field size p. This however comes with the price of adding an extra 2g gap between the number of qualified and unqualified players. This gap is not generally desired as it implies less security (security against fewer players) if one sticks to a fixed number of qualified players. Although both factors above are linear with respect to g, for large enough field size p, the benefit of increasing g is dominant: one can generate √ p − 1 additional shares by allowing an extra 2-player gap in SSS.
We take use of this interesting property in our PMT constructions in which we will have p = 2 λ , where λ is the time interval length.
Problem Description

Multipath setting abstraction
A partial-access multipath communication setting (or multipath setting in brief) refers to an abstract communication system which consists of n disjoint communication paths, out of which at most t a , t b , and t e paths can be accessed by Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively, at any point in time. More precisely, time is divided into equal-length intervals, each of which corresponding to sending λ consecutive bits over at least one path by either Alice or Bob. The parties choose their sets of access paths at the beginning of each time interval and will hold on to their choice till the end of that interval, i.e., until λ bits are communicated over at least one of the paths. This abstraction of time intervals in bits is obtained by multiplying the bit-transmission speed by path switching time. To summarize, a multipath setting is defined by five public parameters of (n, t a , t b , t e , λ). It is implicit that t e , t a , t b ≤ n. We always use t ab = min(t a , t b ) to denote the minimum number of paths that both Alice and Bob can access. For the special case of t a = t b = n, we say the setting provides "full access" to Alice and Bob and refer to the setting as an (n, t e , λ)-full-access setting. This is in line with the existing SMT work [6] which assumes Alice and Bob are not limited in their access. Figure 1 illustrates full-access versus partial-access settings. In general, the value of λ depends on how fast the communicants and (more importantly) Eve can release old paths and capture new paths without possibly missing the live communication. This relates to the actual communication scenario, the communication capability of the transceiver devices, and the transmission speed. We shed more light on this in Section 6: In the practical scenarios considered there, the least interval length λ = 52 corresponds to the multiple-frequency link scenario, and is obtained by multiplying the 1µs switching time between frequencies and the transmission speed of 100 Mbps. Thus for our numerical analysis, we always assume λ > 100.
PMT protocol and secrecy capacity: definition
To send a message S ∈ {0, 1} k securely from Alice to Bob, a PMT protocol allows them to communicate a total of c bits on their accessed paths (possibly back and forth in multiple rounds) so that Bob computes a variableŜ as his estimate of the message S. Eve will obtain the view V iew E (S) of the communication and uses it to obtain some knowledge about S. The randomness in V iew E (.) comes from the randomness of the PMT protocol and that of the adversary.
Definition 1 (PMT Protocol). The protocol Π, as described above, over a multipath setting is a (k, c, δ, )-PMT protocol if it transmits any k-bit message using c bits of communication such that
The secrecy rate of Π is obtained as R = k c . The protocol is called perfectly reliable when δ = 0, perfectly-secret when = 0; if both hold, Π is called a perfectly (P)-PMT protocol.
In practice, the message length may be unknown before hand and one needs a family of PMT protocols that can be used for arbitrarily long messages. Good PMT families are expected to have a guaranteed rate. We define the optimality of a PMT family by its secrecy rate which is measured as the minimum of the rates of all protocols it includes. We define (δ, )-, perfect (P)-, and asymptotically-perfect (AP)-PMT families.
Definition 2 ((δ, )-PMT and P-PMT families). A (δ, )-PMT family F for a multipath setting S is an infinite sequence (Π i ) i∈N , where for each i ∈ N, Π i is a (k i , c i , δ, )-PMT protocol over S and k i+1 > k i . The (δ, )-secrecy rate of F is defined as
When δ = = 0, F is called a perfect (P)-PMT family and the P-secrecy rate is denoted by R F :0 .
P-PMT families include only perfectly-secure protocols (with δ = = 0). Designing such families of protocols is important for highly-sensitive data transmission where absolutely zero failure and leakage is acceptable. There are however scenarios which desire non-zero yet arbitrarily small δ and , i.e., one expects to pick a protocol with δ and as close as desired to zero. We hence define AP-PMT families which include (δ, )-PMT protocols; however, by choosing to send longer messages, the values δ and decrease and tend to zero asymptotically.
Definition 3 (AP-PMT family
). An AP-PMT family F for a multipath setting S is an infinite sequence
The AP-secrecy rate of F is defined as
We shall now define the different types of secrecy capacities for a multipath setting S . The capacity means the highest secrecy rate that can be guaranteed for all message lengths by a PMT protocol.
Definition 4 (Secrecy Capacity). The (δ, )-(resp. P-and AP-) secrecy capacity C δ, (resp. C 0 and C ∼0 ) of a multipath setting S equals the largest (δ, )-(resp. P-and AP-) secrecy rate achievable via all possible (δ, )-(resp. P-and AP-) PMT families over S .
Relation among secrecy capacities
Definition 1 implies that any (k, c, δ 1 , 1 )-PMT protocol is also (k, c, δ 2 , 2 )-PMT for δ 2 ≥ δ 1 and 2 ≥ 1 . Inasmuch as families simply consist of protocols, this suggests that an (δ 1 , 1 )-PMT family is also a (δ 2 , 2 )-PMT family . Put differently, the set of all (δ 2 , 2 )-PMT families is a superset of the set of all (δ 1 , 1 )-PMT families. The conclusion is that C δ2, 2 ≥ C δ1, 1 , and more generally, the capacity C δ, decreases as δ and decrease and is lower bounded by C 0 . Using a similar argument about the relation with AP-PMT families, one can reach at
We ask whether the above inequalities can be replaced by equality. Showing cases for which C ∼0 < C δ, is not ambitious: Consider for instance when t a = t b = t e = n; for = 1 since no secrecy is expected, Alice can achieve reliable transmission at full rate C δ,1 = 1, but requiring arbitrarily small leads to zero rate C ∼0 = 0. The challenging question is, however, the equality of C 0 and C ∼0 . Having an answer to this question is essential: It is fairly reasonable to tolerate arbitrarily small deviation from perfect security in order to improve rate or to convert impossibility of PMT to possibility. In the rest of the paper, we study P-PMT and AP-PMT protocols starting from the special case of full-access communication (when t a = t b = n), and extending it to the general multipath setting. Our study leads us the following ultimate conclusion:
For a wide range of (partial-access) multipath settings, it holds that C ∼0 > C 0 , i.e., AP-PMT results in higher rates than P-PMT.
PMT in the full-access scenario
In the full-access multipath setting, Alice and Bob have access to all paths t a = t b = n; for simplicity, we refer to this as the (n, t e , λ)-full-access setting. Considering this special case when λ = ∞ (i.e. Eve cannot switch her paths in a round once they are chosen), the PMT problem relates to the SMT work (for passive adversary), where the optimal solution simply uses a polynomial-based (n, r, n)-ramp secret sharing scheme (SSS), denoted by (Share pol , Rec pol ), where r = n − t e . The obtained PMT solution, denoted by F pol 0 , is described below. Let S = (S 1 , . . . , S r ) ∈ F r 2 u be the secret message to be transmitted, for arbitrary u > log(2n − t). Polynomial-based P-PMT scheme F pol 0 .
-Alice calculates shares (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ) = Share pol (S) and sends share X i over the i-path (path indices are fixed and public). -Having received X i 's, Bob obtains the message as S = Rec pol (X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n ).
Thanks to the SSS secrecy guarantees, Eve obtains no information from her t shares.
gives a family of (ur, un, 0, 0)-P-PMT protocols with secrecy rate R F pol 0 = 1− te n over the (n, t e , λ)-full-access setting with λ = ∞.
Proof. See Appendix A
P-PMT for finite λ
When λ is finite, the scheme F pol 0 (without any modification) does not provide us with a P-PMT family since it cannot give protocols for arbitrarily message lengths, rather only for u ≤ λ: Recall that the message consists of r field elements in F 2 u , and the SSS shares are from F 2 u . If u > λ, a share X i needs to be sent in more than one time interval. This lets Eve switch her paths and get (partial) information about more than t shares to learn some information about S. However, there is an easy fix to this. To circumvent the above issue, we can always stay with a constant field size 2 λ so that each share is delivered in a "single" time interval, i.e., it will be either completely leaked or perfectly secure (note that Eve has synchronous path switching with communicants). We instead repeat F pol 0 for sufficiently many times (time-intervals) to send arbitrarily long messages; hence, a PMT family.
The situation is however more unfortunate for settings where 2n − t > 2 λ , since F pol 0 cannot provide even a single PMT protocol: The polynomial-based SSS requires 2n − t polynomial points (n − t for message S and n for shares X 1 to X n ); hence the field size 2 u should be at least (2n − t). This cannot happen due to the inequalities 2 u < 2 λ < 2n − t. Proposition 1 concludes our result about
for arbitrary q ∈ N times results in a P-PMT family with secrecy rate R F pol 0 = 1 − te n over any (n, t e , λ)-full-access setting that satisfies 2n − t ≤ 2 λ .
Remark 1. The condition 2n − t e < 2 λ holds for all scenarios of interest in practice: We suppose there cannot be more than a "million" paths (2n − t e < 2 20 ) and switching between paths cannot be done before λ = 50 bits of communication. It remains a theoretical question whether P-PMT is possible when the condition is not satisfied.
When n − 2t e > 2 λ , we show that P-PMT families can be made by using an algebraic-geometric quasi-ramp SSS instead of the polynomial-based one: The replacement allows us to have arbitrarily many shares while staying with a constant field size 2 λ . We define q ∈ N as a factor to introduce increment to the message length. The scheme requires algebraic-geometric SSS with q(2n − t e ) point evaluations, implying using curve genus g such that (
and r = q(n − t e ) − 2g. Let S = (S 1 , . . . , S qr ) ∈ F r 2 λ be the message to be transmitted. We design PMT scheme F alg 0 similarly to F pol 0 , except it uses an (qn − 2g, r, g, qn)-quasi-ramp SSS (Share alg , Rec alg ) over field F 2 λ for secret sharing and sends the message in q time intervals.
Algebraic-geometry P-PMT scheme F alg 0 .
-Alice calculates qn shares X = (X i,j ) 1≤i≤q,1≤j≤n = Share alg (S) and sends each n-share subsequence (X i,j ) 1≤j≤n at time interval i over n randomly chosen paths. -Bob receives all qn shares and calculates S = Rec alg (X).
The secrecy and rate analysis of F alg 0 can be done similarly to that of F pol 0 . The reconstruction and secrecy properties of the quasi-ramp SSS imply that Bob can retrieve the message from his received qn − 2g + 2g = qn shares and Eve obtains no information based on her view of qn − 2g − r = qt e shares. The secrecy rate here is slightly lower than F pol 0 :
where (inequality (a) is obtained by choosing q ≥
Corollary 1. The scheme F alg 0
gives a P-PMT family over any (n, t e , λ) full-access setting. The P-secrecy rate of the family is R F alg 0
Implication to P-secrecy capacity
The existing work on SMT (cf. [17] ) suggests the upper-bound 1 − te n on achievable P-PMT secrecy rates. This combined with the above results leads us to the following approximation of the P-secrecy capacity for the full-access case:
It remains an interesting theoretical question to close the gap between the two bounds. For practical scenarios (λ > 100) however, the gap (2 λ 2 −2 − 0.25) −1 is reasonably close to zero.
AP-PMT in the full-access case
We have so far derived bounds on the P-secrecy capacity in the (n, t e , λ)-full-access setting. We are interested in finding whether rates can be improved if reliability or secrecy requirements are relaxed to asymptotically perfect. To find an answer, we shall obtain the relation between (δ, )-PMT protocols and P-PMT ones and the study this relation when δ and approach to zero.
Upper-bounding (δ, )-secrecy rates via secret-key rates. There may be different ways to upper-bound the secrecy rates achievable by (δ, )-PMT protocols. We here provide a unique approach by upper-bounding secret-key rates of (δ, ) secret-key establishment (SKE) protocols. A SKE protocol is defined similarly to a PMT protocol wherein Alice and Bob communicate possible multiple rounds, however, with the objective establishing a common secret-key. Using same notations as in PMT, we define a SKE protocol as follows.
Definition 5 (SKE Protocol).
A protocol Π over a multipath setting is a (k, c, δ, )-SKE protocol if uses c bits of communication and allows Alice and Bob to calculate key S ∈ {0, 1} k and its estimateŜ ∈ {0, 1} k , respectively, such that Reliability :
where V iew E is Eve's view of the communication and U k is an independent uniform k-bit string.
The secret-key rate of Π is obtained as R = k c . The protocol is called perfectly reliable when δ = 0, perfectlysecret when = 0; if both hold, Π is called a perfectly (P)-SKE protocol.
There is an easy way of obtaining SKE from PMT. A (k, c, δ, )-SKE protocol can be constructed by Alice generating a uniformly random key and sending it to Bob using a (k, c, δ, )-PMT protocol. The (average-case) secrecy and reliability properties of SKE follow trivially from those of PMT (in Definition 1). We conclude:
It thus suffices to show an upper bound on the secret-key rates of (δ, ) SKE protocols in the full-access case. We do this in two steps. First, we show any SKE protocol can be made perfectly-reliable by increasing secrecy parameter by δ. Second, we show that relaxing secrecy causes no more than a 1 1−O( ) factor improvement to the secrecy rate. The combination gives an upper-bound on achievable rates by (δ, ) SKE (and also PMT) protocols.
Step 1: Considering the effect of δ in SKE. Perfectly-reliable communication is inherent in the full-access case: Alice and Bob have access to all paths and Eve is passive. Alice and Bob may however decide to introduce intentional error to their computation in order to decrease information leakage and/or to increase the secrecy rate. In his proof of weak to strong secret-key capacity for instance, Maurer [15] shows that Alice can convert her almost-uniform key string to a perfectly-uniform one by passing it through a slightly noisy channel (i.e., by adding intentional error). We show below that by adding intentional error, Alice and Bob may not obtain more than trivial improvement to their leakage in the full-access case. Lemma 1 shows that δ-reliability can be made perfect at the price of increasing the secrecy parameter by δ and without affecting the rate.
Lemma
Proof. See Appendix B.
Step 2: Considering the effect of in SKE. Thanks to Step 1, we now only focus perfectly-reliable SKE. Lemma 2 proves us an upper-bound on the secret-key rates of such protocols. The proof uses the relation between statistical-distance secrecy and mutual-information secrecy to show that allowing for leakage causes only a factor of Proof. See Appendix C.
Combining the two steps. Combining Lemmas 1 and 2 and applying them to Corollary 2 gives us the following result for any (δ, )-PMT in the full-access setting.
Theorem 2. There is no (one-way or two-way) (k, c, δ, )-PMT protocol in the (n, t e , λ)-full-access setting with k c > (1 − t e /n)/(1 − 1.25 − log ), where = ( + δ)/(1 − δ). This implies the (δ, )-secrecy capacity upper-bound
and the AP-secrecy capacity bounds (using the lower-bound in (4))
The bounds (4) and (7) show that both secrecy capacities fall in the same range. Assuming that ∆ is negligible, we reach that P-secrecy and AP-secrecy capacities both equal 1 − te t ab . With this assumption, we have the conclusion:
Relaxing security requirements from perfect to asymptotically-perfect does NOT help improve the secrecy rate in the "full-access" case.
Although the relaxation of security to asymptotically perfect did not cause rate improvement to full-access PMT, it may be of benefit to the general case where t a , t b ≤ n. This motivates us to extend our study to the general multipath setting. We start by considering P-PMT protocols and next look at AP-PMT protocols.
P-PMT: capacity and construction
We show that the P-secrecy capacity of any (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath communication setting equals approx-
] + , where t ab = min(t a , t b ). For this we shall derive lower and upper bounds that are almost tight. The lower bound follows trivially by applying one-round P-PMT schemes F pol 0 and F alg 0
(for the full-access case) to a fixed set of t ab paths and forgetting about the rest n − t ab paths. But this protocol is simple and one-round; one may wonder if there are (possibly) multiple-round P-PMT protocols that achieve better rates. We prove an upper-bound on the secrecy rates of (one-way and interactive) P-PMT protocols, which shows there is no room for improving the P-secrecy rate of 1 − te t ab in the general (one-way/two-way) multipath setting. The results also conclude the impossibility of P-PMT (of any rate) when t e ≥ t ab .
Lower-bound via one-round P-PMT. The lower-bound on C 0 is attained by using the same schemes F pol 0 and F alg 0 (selectively based on whether 2n − t < 2 λ ), however, over a fixed (hard-coded) set of t ab paths. By fixing these paths, Alice and Bob can realize a (t ab , t e , λ)-full-access setting for which the above P-PMT constructions promise the secrecy rate of 1 − (4)). This of course requires that t e ≤ t ab .
Upper-bound on all P-PMT rates. We derive an upper-bound on the secrecy rate of any (possibly multipleround) P-PMT protocol that can be designed for a general multipath setting. Informally, the upper-bound is proved by showing that to provide "perfect" secrecy, Alice and Bob should be prepared for the "worst" case when Eve captures t e of their t ab common communication paths, even if such a worst case occurs with a very small probability. This is similar to a setting where Alice and Bob have full access to a total of t ab (public) paths, t e of which can be accessed by Eve; hence the maximum rate 1 − t e /t ab . is nearly optimal. Theorem 3 summarizes the results on the P-secrecy capacity in the general setting.
Theorem 3. The P-secrecy capacity of any (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath setting is bounded as L 0 ≤ C 0 ≤ U 0 , where
and the lower-bound is achieved by an explicit one-round PMT protocol.
AP-PMT: Capacity and constructions
We showed that in the full-access case, allowing for arbitrarily small δ, > 0 leads to the same PMT rate upper-bound as if δ = = 0 (see Section 4.3). The result however cannot be applied to the general multipath setting: The upper-bound proof of Theorem 2 does not apply to the (δ, )-secrecy capacity in the partial-access case. This is because Lemma 1 only works for the full-access case where reliable communication is inherent. This leaves us with the trivial upper-bound of
At first look, the above upper seems far from being tight. It seems impossible for Alice and Bob to reach secrecy rates up to 1 − te n , which is regardless of their access capabilities t a and t b .We prove provided that λ is sufficiently large, the upper bound is almost tight and there are AP-PMT families which can get close to this rate even if t a and t b are small. For one-way multipath setting, the required connectivity condition is t b > t e ; for two-way setting however, AP-PMT is always possible only if t e < n and t a , t b > 0. We introduce three AP-PMT schemes, two of which are one-round constructions for the one-way multipath setting and the last is a two-round construction for the two-way setting.
AP-PMT Approach All three AP-PMT schemes, we introduce below, consist of two primitive blocks: (i) low-rate key establishment block and (ii) high-rate coordinated PMT block. Both blocks take use of the algebraicgeometric quasi-ramp SSS of Section 2.1. The key-establishment block allows Alice and Bob to share a long enough secret-key W ; this can be via either one-round key transport or interactive key agreement depending on the setting privileges. By the coordinated PMT block, Alice sends her message over secret paths chosen based on W : Since Eve is unaware of W , the coordinated PMT rate can be as high as (almost) 1 − te n , as if Alice and Bob possess full access. Provided that the communication overhead of the key-establishment block is negligible, the overall rate of the scheme tends toward that of the second block, i.e., 1 − te n . The size of the coordination key W depends on how long message is to be transmitted. We use parameters q 1 , q 2 ∈ N for the number of time-intervals for key establishment and coordinated PMT, respectively; hence, to allow for flexible message length transmission. Each interval of coordinated PMT requires w = log n t ab bits of shared key for Alice and Bob to choose secret paths; on the other hand, each key-establishment interval produces some r 1 λ (defined in the sequel) bits of key. This clarifies the relation q 1 r 1 λ = q 2 w between the number of intervals. In the following, we provide detailed descriptions for the AP-PMT schemes separately.
One-round AP-PMT for t e ≤ t ab We introduce a one-round AP-PMT scheme F 1 with an AP-secrecy rate close to 1 − te n . The scheme has perfect reliability, but allows for negligible leakage. It composes a key-transport block (made by P-PMT) and a coordinated PMT block as follows. Given the (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath setting, define w = log n t ab . For arbitrarily small ψ > 0, and sufficiently large q 1 ∈ N (to be defined in Theorem 4), define
Let (Share alg,1 , Rec alg,1 ) denote the algebraic-geometric (q 1 t ab −2g 1 , r 1 , g 1 , q 1 t ab )-quasi-ramp SSS over F 2 λ used for key transport, and (Share alg,2 , Rec alg,2 ) denote the algebraic-geometric (q 2 t ab − 2g 2 , r 2 , g 2 , q 2 t ab )-quasi-ramp SSS over F 2 λ used for coordinated PMT. Let T 0 be a set of fixed t ab paths publicly known to the protocol. Let S ∈ F r2 2 λ be the message to be transmitted by Alice. One-round (0, )-PMT scheme F 1 .
(i) Key transport (intervals 1 to q 1 ). Alice generates random keys W = (W 1 , . . . , W q2 ) ∈ {0, 1} q2w ; note that q 2 w = r 1 λ. She obtains q 1 t ab shares of W as (X i,j ) 1≤i≤q1,1≤j≤t ab = Share alg,1 (W ) and sends the t ab shares (X i,j ) 1≤j≤t ab over distinct paths in T 0 during interval 1 ≤ i ≤ q 1 . Having received all shares, Bob reconstructs the transported key as W = Rec alg,1 (X). The number of bits communicated at this stage equals:
(ii) Coordinated PMT (intervals q 1 + 1 to q 1 + q 2 ). Alice and Bob use key element W i ∈ {0, 1} w to agree on a path set T i of size t ab for interval q 1 + i. This gives them a total of q 2 t ab paths available for q 2 consecutive time-intervals. Alice calculates shares of her message as Y = (Y i,j ) 1≤i≤q2,1≤j≤t ab = Share alg,2 (S) and sends the t ab shares (Y i,j ) 1≤j≤t ab over T i during interval q 1 +i. Having received all shares Y , Bob calculates S = Rec alg,2 (Y ). This stage requires communicating the following number of bits:
The secrecy rate of block (ii) equals
which tends to 1 − te n for arbitrarily small ψ > 0. The overall secrecy rate of F 1 is lower due to the communication overhead of block (i). Theorem 4 shows the achievable rates by F 1 as a function of setting parameters.
Theorem 4. For any small ψ, > 0, the scheme F 1 gives (0, )-PMT and AP-PMT families over an (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath setting with t e < t ab ≤ n. The AP-secrecy rate of the scheme equals
, where ξ 1 = log(
Proof. See Appendix E.
Remark 2. It is crucial to use an algebraic-geometric SSS, particularly for the second block, coordinated PMT. Expecting arbitrarily small > 0 requires using SSS with sufficiently many (q 2 t ab ) shares for constant field size 2 λ .
The secrecy rate R F1:∼0 is close to the upper-bound expression (9), except there is a subtracting factor ∆ due to using quasi-threshold SSS and a divisive factor (1 + ξ 1 ) because of the communication overhead ξ 1 of the key-transport block. Comparing this rate with the P-secrecy capacity shows an improvement of secrecy rates by using AP-PMT.
One-round AP-PMT for t e ≥ t ab The scheme F 1 cannot achieve any positive secrecy rate when t e ≥ t ab ; hence, the AP-secrecy capacity for this range is unknown. We observe the following two limitations of F 1 .
-F 1 has perfect reliability. Allowing for positive but small failure probability δ > 0 in transmission may lead to higher secrecy rates. -F 1 is non-interactive. It may be possible to improve the rate via interactive communication between Alice and Bob.
The above two reasons encourage us to investigate families of AP-PMT schemes that allow non-perfect reliability and/or are interactive. We first consider only one-way communication and study whether relaxing perfect reliability can make AP-PMT possible even when t e ≥ t ab .
Below, we describe the PMT scheme F 2 which relaxes both reliability and secrecy of transmission, but results in PMT possibility in a wider connectivity range of t e < t b . Here, the protocol fixes a set T 0 of max(t a , t b ) ≤ n ≤ n (instead of t ab ) paths for key transport, i.e., Alice sends over t a paths and Bob listens over t b paths, both of which are selected independently at random (if applicable) from the n fixed paths. The reliability is not perfect since the path selection can be random. The details of the scheme are given below.
Given the (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath setting, let w = log n t ab . For arbitrarily small ψ > 0, and sufficiently large q 1 ∈ N (to be defined in Theorem 5), define
Let (Share alg,1 , Rec alg,1 ) denote the algebraic-geometric (q 1 t b,1 − 2g 1 , r 1 , g 1 , q 1 t a )-quasi-ramp SSS over field F 2 λ used for key transport, and (Share alg,2 , Rec alg,2 ) denote the algebraic-geometric (q 2 t ab −2g 2 , r 2 , g 2 , q 2 t ab )-quasi-ramp SSS over field F 2 λ used for coordinated PMT. Let S ∈ F r2 2 λ be the message to be transmitted by Alice.
One-round (δ, )-PMT scheme F 2 .
(i) Key transport (intervals 1 to q 1 ). Alice generates random keys W = (W 1 , . . . , W q2 ) ∈ {0, 1} w and obtains q 1 t a shares of W as (X i,j ) 1≤i≤q1,1≤j≤ta = Share alg,1 (W ). In each round 1 ≤ i ≤ q 1 , she sends the t a shares (X i,j ) 1≤j≤ta over t a (possibly) random paths from T 0 , and Bob listens over t b (possibly) random paths from T 0 . If Bob's overall observation X includes less than q 1 t b,1 share elements (X i,j 's), he aborts and chooses a randomŜ ∈ F r2 2 λ ; otherwise, he reconstructs the transported key as W = Rec alg,1 (X ). The number of bits communicated at this stage equals:
(ii) Coordinated PMT (intervals q 1 + 1 to q 1 + q 2 ). Alice and Bob use key element W i ∈ {0, 1} w to agree on a path set T i of size t ab for interval i + q 1 . This gives them a total of q 2 t ab secret paths available for q consecutive time-intervals. Alice calculates shares of message as Y = (Y i,j ) 1≤i≤q2,1≤j≤t ab = Share alg,2 (S) and sends the t ab shares (Y i,j ) 1≤j≤t ab over T i during interval i + q 1 . Having received all shares Y , Bob calculates S = Rec alg,2 (Y ). At this stage, the number of communicated bits is:
Like F 1 , the coordinated PMT rate in the above scheme tends to 1− te n , whereas the overall rate is lower due to the key-transport overhead. The difference with F 1 is that F 2 does not use perfectly-reliable key transport; this allows for pushing the multipath connectivity condition to t e > t b . The scheme relies on the following assumptions: In key transport, Bob receives at least q 1 t b,1 shares and Eve receives at most q 1 t e,1 shares of W ; furthermore, in coordinated PMT Eve receives at most q 2 t e,2 shares of S. If the above assumptions hold, the PMT becomes perfectly reliable and secret thanks for the secrecy and reconstruction properties of the two quasi-ramp SS schemes. The δ-reliability and -secrecy properties come from the case that the assumptions fail.
Theorem 5. For any small ψ, δ, > 0, the scheme F 2 gives (δ, )-PMT and AP-PMT families over any (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath setting with t e < t b . The AP-secrecy rate of this scheme reaches
, where ξ 2 = log(
Proof. See Appendix F.
Remark 3. The Scheme F 2 can be simplified to achieve a higher rate when t b = n. For this special case, only Stage (i) the key transport block can be used to serve message transmission at rate
Impossibility of one-way PMT for t e ≥ t b . It is impossible to obtain AP-PMT in one-round when t e ≥ t b , i.e., when Eve has access to more paths than Bob. The intuition is that Eve will have total advantage over Bob and any protocol that lets Bob obtain a good estimate of the message will let Eve too. Proof. See Appendix G.
Implication to one-way capacity. Putting all things together, we reach the following conclusion about the AP-secrecy capacity for one-way communication. When t e ≥ t b , one-way AP-PMT is impossible and the capacity is zero. When t ab ≤ t e < t b (if applicable), only Scheme F 2 can be used and hence the capacity is lower-bounded by R F2:∼0 . Finally, when t e < t ab , both schemes F 1 and F 2 can be used and the lower bound on the capacity equals the maximum of the two rates R F1:∼0 and R F2:∼0 .
, and
In the next section, we show that using interactive communication, Alice and Bob attain AP-PMT with positive rate even if t e ≥ t b .
AP-PMT: Always positive rates via two-way communication
We introduce a two-round (interactive) AP-PMT scheme and show its security even under the condition that t e ≥ t b . The idea is similar to the previous schemes except that the first block is now an interactive key-agreement (rather than key-transport) protocol: Bob sends random data elements over random paths and Alice publicly responds (over a fixed path) which elements she has received. Having known about their common elements, Alice and Bob apply privacy amplification to convert them into a secret-key. We take use of the algebraic-geometric SSS for privacy amplification.
Given the (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath setting, let w 1 = log n t a,1
and w 2 = log n t ab
. For arbitrarily small ψ > 0, and sufficiently large q 1 ∈ N (to be defined in Theorem 6), define
Let (Share alg,1 , Rec alg,1 ) denote the algebraic-geometric (q 1 t a,1 − 2g 1 , r 1 , g 1 , q 1 t a,1 )-quasi-ramp SSS over field F 2 λ used for key transport, and (Share alg,2 , Rec alg,2 ) denote the algebraic-geometric (q 2 t ab −2g 2 , r 2 , g 2 , q 2 t ab )-quasi-ramp SSS over field F 2 λ used for coordinated PMT. Let S ∈ F r2 2 λ be the message to be transmitted by Alice.
Two-round (δ, )-PMT scheme F 3 .
(i) Interactive key agreement (intervals 1 to q 1 ). Bob generates q 1 t b random elements X = (X i,j ) 1≤i≤q1,1≤j≤t b ∈ (F λ 2 ) q1t b and sends them in q 1 time intervals: In each time interval 1 ≤ i ≤ q, he sends (X i,j ) 1≤j≤t b over t b (independently) randomly chosen paths. If Alice's observation includes less than q 1 t a,1 field elements from X (sent by Bob), she sends an abort signal and Bob outputs a random message estimation S ∈ R F r2 2 λ . Otherwise, let X A ⊆ X consist of the first q 1 t a,1 field elements observed by Alice over paths (P i ) 1≤i≤q1 . Alice sends the information of (P i ) 1≤i≤q1 (requiring at most q 1 w 1 bits) over a (fixed/public) path to Bob. Alice and Bob both know X A and use them as shares of quasi-ramp SSS to obtain the key
2 λ (note that r 1 λ = q 2 w 2 ). The communication overhead of this stage equals:
(ii) Coordinated PMT (intervals q 1 + 1 to q 1 + q 2 ). Alice and Bob use key elements W i ∈ {0, 1} w2 to agree on q 2 path sets T i of size t ab for intervals q 1 + 1 ≤ q 1 + i ≤ q 1 + q 2 . Alice calculates shares of message as Y = (Y i,j ) 1≤i≤q2,1≤j≤n = Share alg,2 (S) and sends (Y i,j ) 1≤j≤t ab over T i during interval q 1 + i. Having received Y , Bob calculatesŜ = S = Rec alg,2 (Y ). The number of communicated bits is:
Theorem 6. For any small ψ, δ, > 0, the scheme F 3 gives (δ, )-PMT and AP-PMT families over any (n, t a , t b , t e , λ) multipath setting, with t a , t b > 0 and t e < n. The AP-secrecy rate of this family equals:
, where
Proof. See Appendix H.
Implication to two-way capacity. When two-way communication is allowed, the AP-secrecy capacity is trivially upper-bound by 1 − te n , unless obviously when t a = 0 or t b = 0. We have the following lower bounds on the other hand. For t e < t ab , all schemes F 1 , F 2 , and F 3 can be used and the maximum rate shows the lower bound. When t ab ≤ t e < t b (if applicable), the lower bound is achieved by F 2 or F 3 . Finally when t e ≥ t b , onlt the interactive scheme F 3 is usable and the capacity is lower-bounded by R F3:∼0 .
Corollary 4. The AP-secrecy capacity of any (n, t a , t b , t e , λ)-multipath setting satisfies L ∼0 ≤ C ∼0 ≤ U ∼0 , where
Comparison of P-secrecy and AP-secrecy rates
We have proved that in the case of partial-access multipath communication, Alice and Bob can achieve higher secrecy rates if they choose AP-PMT protocols over P-PMT ones. We also introduced AP-PMT families with rates close to the upper-bound 1 − t n . It has remained unclear, however, how much of rate improvement is attained by AP-PMT protocols in practice and how close the resulting rate is to the upper-bound. We address this by analyzing P-secrecy and AP-secrecy capacities for typical multipath parameters that match practical communication scenarios.
P-secrecy vs. AP-secrecy capacities Although the two capacities equal for the full-access case (t a = t b = n), we argue that when t ab < n, the AP-secrecy capacity is strictly larger that the P-secrecy capacity for almost all cases. The following argument is given based on Corollaries 3 and 4.
Case 1: t e ≥ t ab . The P-secrecy capacity equals zero and is thus strictly less than the AP-secrecy capacity provided that 1 − te n > ∆, which is true for the connectivity range of t ab ≤ t e < n(1 − ∆). Case 2: t e < t ab . In this case, both secrecy capacities are positive. However, achievable AP-secrecy rates are strictly higher than the P-secrecy capacity if
, which implies the range
Corollary 5. The strict inequality C ∼0 > C 0 holds for any (n, t a , t b , t e , λ)-multipath setting that satisfies
where ∆ and ξ 1 are given in Theorem 4. As ∆ goes to zero, the above connectivity range tends to
n < t e < n, where α = t ab n .
Corollary 5 clearly does not imply any range in the full-access case where α = 1; however, with a slight deviation from full access, the superiority of AP-PMT rates holds for a wide connectivity range. Assuming for example λ = 100 (hence ∆ < 10 −14 ≈ 0) and partial access t ab = 0.2n, AP-PMT shows strictly higher rates for the wide range of 0.01n < t e < n. This however should not imply that our constructions achieve the AP-secrecy capacity for this range. The next section shows how deviation from full-access results in a larger gap between the lower and upper bounds on C ∼0 . Figure 2(a) graphs the lower and upper bounds on C ∼0 as well as C 0 for different values of β = te n , assuming λ = 100 (hence ∆ ≈ 0) and t a = t b = 0.2n. For this value of λ, we approximate C 0 ≈ 1 − te t ab = 1 − 5β (see Theorem 3) . The capacity C 0 is shown by a solid line and the bounds L ∼0 and U ∼0 are shown by dotted and dashed lines, respectively. The graph clearly illustrates the benefit of using AP-PMT over P-PMT in the multipath setting. Both P-secrecy and AP-secrecy capacities show linear decrement with respect to β; however, C 0 drops much faster and equals 0 for β ≥ 0.2. The lower bound on C ∼0 shows that this capacity remains positive and close to the upper-bound U ∼0 = 1 − te n throughout. For β ≤ 0.15, the lower bound is very close to the upper bound and is achieved by one-round AP-PMT (F 1 or F 2 ) . Outside of this range, the achievable rates by our one-round AP-PMT rate drops drastically and tend to 0 at β = 0.2. This is not surprising since one-way AP-PMT is impossible when t e ≥ t b (implying β ≥ 0.2). For β ≥ 0.15, the lower-bound is attained by our two-round scheme F 3 . Observe that the gap between the two bounds for this range which is due to the overheard factor ξ 3 (see rate R F3:∼0 in Theorem 6). The gap between the bounds on C ∼0 bridges as we move towards full access by increasing Alice's and Bob's connectivity t a and t b . This is partly intuitive since in the full-access case (t a = t b = n) both P-secrecy and AP-secrecy capacities are expected to equal 1 − te n . But what causes the gap when t a and t b are relatively small is mainly due to the two-round AP-PMT with larger communication overhead (ξ 3 ). Figure 2 (b) graphs the same three quantities (C 0 , L ∼0 , and U ∼0 ) with respect to α = t ab n , assuming λ = 100, t a = t b , and t e = 0.2n. Observe that the AP-secrecy capacity upper-bound is always U ∼0 = 1 − te n = 0.8. For α ≥ 0.25, one-round AP-PMT is possible and achieves rates quite close to U ∼0 . For α < 0.25, the interactive AP-PMT F 3 produces higher rates. This experiment shows we do not have a close approximation of achievable rates in the low connectivity regime, where t a , t b < t e . Finding an answer to this question remains an open problem.
Numerical analysis of secrecy capacity
Practical Consideration
We discuss two practical applications of our PMT results in the multipath setting model, i.e., sending secret data over (i) multiple-frequency links and (ii) multiple-route networks. Both communication scenarios include a set of paths that connect the communicants and can be tapped into by present eavesdroppers. Provided that the communication system does not allow access to all paths to the parties (in particular the eavesdropper), we hope for the possibility of PMT.
PMT using multiple-frequency links
It is clear to see that multiple-frequency communication environments, such as wireless, realize the multipath setting described in this work. There are many non-overlapping frequency channels that can be used for signal transmission between a sender and a receiver and the communication may be intercepted by an eavesdropper tapping into the system. Our PMT results promise the possibility of secure communication here, provided that the eavesdropper does not have simultaneous access to all frequencies (i.e., t e < n in our setting). The challenge is thus to design a multiple-frequency system that makes it infeasible for the adversary to capture data over all frequency channels. Unfortunately, existing frequency-hopping solutions do not satisfy this requirement. Bluetooth for example transmits data at speed of 1Mbps over 79 adjacent 1-MHz frequency channels within the 2.4-2.48 GHz band. By the current technology, one can obtain a receiver device much smaller than a laptop to capture all 80-MHz Bluetooth range, convert it into digital, and store it to a disk at a rate in the order of 80 Mbps. This lets the eavesdropper record hours of communication in a 1 Terabyte disk.
It is yet possible to design systems that serve our purpose. It is practically infeasible to have a single transceiver device (in particular ADC) to deal with wider than 100 MHz of the flying signal [14] . All we need is to use a system whose frequency channels are far apart. Consider for instance a system design that uses n = 70 20-MHz frequency-channels that are distributed evenly (with 80-MHz distances) over the 57-64 GHz frequency range. This range is called the FCC unlicensed millimeter-wave band and is allocated by Canada/US for WiGig (Gigabit WiFi). Data over each channel is transmitted at the speed of at least 100 Mbps, (e.g., by using 6-bit 64-QAM modulation). Since there is only one frequency channel in each 100-MHz slot, the eavesdropper would require 70 transceiver blocks to access all 70 channels simultaneously. This may not be practical in certain scenarios due to device expense issues or physical space restriction (e.g., stealth attack on indoor communication). Let us assume that up to t e = 35 (i.e. n/2) transceiver blocks can be embedded in the eavesdropper's device, while the legitimate communicants are provided with only four such blocks, implying simultaneous access to t a = t b = 4 channels.
We have figured out all the multipath setting parameters, except the interval length λ. The eavesdropper may want to switch between the 10-MHz frequency channels to learn more information about the communication. Fastest frequency synthesizers allow the eavesdropper to switch between these channels in about 1µs [1] . Although we may allow a larger switching time for legitimate communicants, the 1µs switching time determines λ in our design. At the speed of 100 Mpbs, we obtain λ = 10 −6 × 100 × 2 20 = 104 bits: The transmitter sends 104 bits over each accessed channel and then switches to a next set of channels, thus preventing the eavesdropper from switching channels during the 104-bit long interval. This example leads us to the (70, 4, 4, 35, 104)-multipath setting for which the two-round (interactive) AP-PMT scheme F 3 sends private data at rate 17%. This solution does not require pre-shared keys and provides information-theoretic security.
PMT using multiple-route networks
Large networks such as sensor networks, mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs), and the Internet allow nodes to communicate over possibly multiple routes. It has been shown [24] that when multiple routes are available, the communicants can benefit from multipath routing to enhance the reliability of transmission. We would like to study whether multipath routing can be used for privacy of communication in the case an eavesdropper taps into some intermediate router nodes. We here focus on communication over MANETs. Studies have shown that the average number of node-disjoint paths in a moderately-dense MANET (of around 500 nodes) is usually more than 10. We consider the following scenario: There are a total of n = 10 paths between the source node and the destination node. The source can send only over t a = 2 paths while the destination receives data through all t b = 10 paths. The adversary's resources allow for compromising at most t e = 8 paths at a time, and at least 1 millisecond is needed to redirect resources to tap into new nodes (and paths); this is quite plausible, noting the technical challenges of tapping into communicating devices. The source transmits data at the speed of 512 Kbps, implying λ = 10 −3 × 512 × 2 10 = 524. This leads to the (10, 2, 8, 10, 524)-multipath setting for which the simplified version of scheme F 2 (with Stage (i) only -see Remark 3) guarantees private transmission at the highest possible rate of 20%.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have derived the necessary and sufficient conditions for the possibility of P-PMT and AP-PMT in the multipath setting. We also derived lower and upper bounds on the P-secrecy and AP-secrecy capacities. Although in the full-access case (t a = t b = 1) P-PMT and AP-PMT behave the same, in general, AP-PMT protocols may attain much higher secrecy rates. The maximum rate for P-PMT is [1 − te t ab ] + , whereas AP-PMT protocols can achieves much higher rates close to the upper-bound 1 − te n . The is yet a gap between the proved achievable rates and this upper-bound. Bridging the gap is an interesting question which we leave for future work.
Any practical communication system that benefits from the diversity of communication paths can be a test case to show the feasibility our PMT results. We considered this for the real-life scenarios of communication over multiple-frequency links and multiple-route networks. In both cases, we elaborated on how to derive multipath setting parameters and use our results to provide private communication at rates 17% and 20%, respectively. Showing the possibility of keyless communication with information-theoretic privacy is interesting. A followup work can be the design of concrete protocols considering all practical and technical concerns that may have been missing in this work.
A Proof of Theorem 1
It is clear that the message length equals k = ru and the number of communication bits is c = nu. This implies the secrecy rate of R = ru nu = 1− te n . Perfect reliability (δ = 0) holds from the reconstruction property of the SSS noting that Bob receives all shares X i 's. Perfect secrecy ( = 0) follows from the secrecy property of the SSS: Eve by collecting t e shares is unqualified and so for any message distribution S, it holds I(S; V iew E (S)) = 0, implying ∀s 1 , s 2 ∈ {0, 1} k : SD(V iew E (s 1 ), V iew E (s 2 )) = 0.
B Proof of Lemma 1
Since Eve is passive, full-access communicants Alice and Bob will have the same view of the communication transcript, denoted by X, by the (k, c, δ, )-PMT protocol Π over the multipath setting. Following the protocol Π, Alice calculates the key S = f (X, Rnd A ) and Bob calculates its estimateŜ = g(X, Rnd B ) using key derivation functions f (., .) and g(., .) as well as local randomness Rnd A and Rnd B , respectively. We shall convert Π to a new protocol Π that provides the same rate and has perfect reliability. We build Π by converting the functions f and g to deterministic functions, which require no local randomness.
Step 1: Making g(.,.) deterministic. We write We define the deterministic function g (X) = g(X, R * B (X)). Bob will guarantee δ-reliability by returninĝ S = g (X) instead ofŜ, i.e., Pr(Ŝ = S) ≥ Pr(Ŝ = S).
Step 2: Making f(.,.) deterministic. For each x as an instance of the communication transcript X, define the set R A (x) = {r | f (x, r) = g (x)}.
The set includes randomness values that, if chosen by Alice, lead to the prefect reliability of key establishment. Perfectly reliability can be thus obtained as the event E which refers to when Rnd A ∈ R A (X). Usinh the reliability property of Π, the event E occurs with probability Pr(E) = Pr(Ŝ = S) ≥ Pr(Ŝ = S) ≥ 1 − δ.
Let R * A (X) be an arbitrary (but fixed) member of the random set R A (X). Define deterministic key derivation function f (X) = f (X, R
